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Revisiting the Tinbergen Rule:
use the macroprudential tools 
to maintain ﬁ  nancial stability
Capital ﬂ  ows to emerging market economies, which have intensiﬁ  ed recently due to better growth prospects, 
interest rate differentials, and better risk perceptions, have the potential to destabilise ﬁ  nancial systems in these 
countries which are typically neither diversiﬁ  ed nor deep enough to absorb such ﬂ  ows. While tools to manage 
large capital ﬂ  ows are well known, the appropriate policy mix depends on country-speciﬁ  c circumstances. 
Fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate policy, foreign exchange market intervention, macroprudential 
tools, and capital controls could be used to cope with the volatility of capital ﬂ  ows, but each of them entails 
some tradeoff. The challenge faced by central banks is to establish a framework that combines both price 
and ﬁ  nancial stability as primary objectives and identify policy instruments to target both, even at times 
they seem to conﬂ  ict with each other. In today’s challenging ﬁ  nancial environment, public authorities in 
Turkey have underscored four basic principles upon which the ﬁ  scal, monetary and regulatory policies 
would be built to maintain ﬁ  nancial stability. These are (1) use of more equity, less leverage; (2) extending 
the duration of borrowing; (3) strengthening the foreign exchange position and use of local currency in 
borrowing; and (4) better management of foreign currency risk. This approach aims to use current global 
ﬁ  nancial environment as an opportunity to strengthen the country’s ﬁ  nancial position and to support 
deepening of its ﬁ  nancial system without jeopardising its health and stability.
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M
ore than two years after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, the dust over 
international financial system seems 
somewhat abated. Unprecedented measures taken 
by central banks and ﬁ  scal authorities have put 
ﬁ  nancial markets back on a relatively steady course 
by late 2009. As economic activity has started to 
gain pace, risk perceptions gradually improved, 
notwithstanding heightened sovereignty risk in the 
Euro area, concerns over housing and labor markets 
in the United States, uncertainty regarding the health 
of ﬁ  nancial institutions in advanced economies, 
huge inﬂ  ux of capital ﬂ  ows and associated risks in 
emerging market economies, and last but not least, 
questions surrounding the pace of demand rotation 
in the global economy. A long list of lessons on 
ﬁ  nancial stability has emerged, though how to put 
them in practice is subject to an intense debate. 
The cooperation at a global scale is the key to solve 
current problems and addressing the future ones, but 
to maintain the spirit of cooperation among nations 
is getting more challenging as the memory of the 
crisis starts to fade away.
In the ﬁ  rst part of this article, the challenges faced by 
the emerging market economies in the aftermath of 
the crisis are addressed. Next, the role of central banks 
to maintain ﬁ  nancial stability is revisited. Finally, in 
the third part, the experience of the Turkish economy 
and the response of the monetary policy to recent 
challenges are discussed. 
1| OUTLOOK FOR EMERGING MARKET 
ECONOMIES
Capital flows to emerging market economies 
have intensiﬁ  ed recently thanks to better growth 
prospects, interest rate differentials, and relative 
stability of ﬁ  nancial institutions in these countries 
that proved their strength and ﬂ  exibility to extreme 
shocks. Highly accommodative monetary policies in 
several advanced economies have played a major 
role in further accelerating this trend as well. As a 
result, emerging market economies today are facing 
a growing risk of asset bubbles, excessive borrowing 
and inflationary pressures –all of which are 
threatening their ﬁ  nancial stability. The problems 
facing countries with current account deﬁ  cits are 
much more challenging than those with surpluses, 
since they have to deal with both ﬁ  nancial stability 
problems arising from the strength of capital ﬂ  ows 
and the risk of sudden stops.
 
As liquidity in the global ﬁ  nancial system increases 
thanks to the rapid expansion of high powered money 
in major currency countries, central banks of small 
open economies face the risk of losing control over 
monetary conditions in their countries. The favorable 
environment for hedging maturity and interest rate 
risks, together with ﬂ  atter yield curves are weakening 
the inﬂ  uence of central banks over the long end of 
the curve. Policy rate hikes to contain inﬂ  ationary 
pressures and restrain credit expansion are likely to 
lead to further widening in interest rate differentials, 
thereby fueling even more capital inﬂ  ows, more 
borrowing, higher asset prices and inﬂ  ation. Moreover, 
credits extended by domestic banking system or 
foreign ﬁ  nancial system in foreign currency would 
not be affected directly from the policy rate. 
For the last two years, G20 countries have highlighted 
the importance of macroprudential regulations to 
address systemic risks in the ﬁ  nancial sector and 
displayed unprecedented unity and cooperation to 
lay the foundations of a new ﬁ  nancial system less 
prone to generating boom-bust cycles. Recently, 
as the volatility of capital ﬂ  ows has become a major 
source of concern in emerging market economies, 
the G20 has also recognised it as another systemic risk 
that has to be addressed collectively. Many emerging 
countries have already started implementing a wide 
range of measures to contain the credit growth 
and asset price bubbles, including policy rate 
hikes, enacting various macroprudential measures 
(such as increasing reserve requirement ratios, 
raising loan-to-value ratios, sector speciﬁ  c surgical 
tightening) and putting various restrictions on capital 
inﬂ  ows. The adequacy of such measures has yet to be 
seen, but the swift and proactive response of policy 
makers is a positive step forward, since the most 
recent events have clearly demonstrated that it is 
likely to cost less to undertake preventive measures 
prior to a crisis than to clean up in its aftermath.
Capital ﬂ  ows that exceed the absorption capacity 
of emerging economies have the potential to 
destabilise ﬁ  nancial systems in these countries. 
However, the adoption of capital controls in response 
to such risks would only derail the much needed 
adjustment process, shifting the burden of demand 
rotation disproportionately on the shoulders of 
emerging countries that are open to capital ﬂ  ows 
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and thereby sowing the seeds of the next crisis. 
Addressing imbalances in the global economy to 
achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth 
would require an adjustment in real exchange 
rates, either through nominal exchange rates or 
relative prices or both. Some policy makers favor 
the former channel, since it is likely to lead to a 
faster adjustment. As currencies of emerging surplus 
countries appreciate compared to those of advanced 
deﬁ  cit countries, domestic demand would shift away 
from goods and services offered by the emerging 
markets in favor of the advanced economies. Critics 
of that view highlight the potential instability that 
may arise from disorderly movements (in terms 
of both speed and magnitude) in currencies and 
propose a demand rotation through a gradual change 
in relative prices. In that approach, inﬂ  ation rates 
in emerging surplus countries would stay above 
those of advanced deﬁ  cit countries in the short to 
medium term, thanks to rising purchasing power 
of households through higher wages, easier access 
to ﬁ  nancial markets and better protection through 
social safety nets. Whereas nominal appreciation of 
currency would encourage solely redistribution of 
global demand (and possibly production capacity) 
without expanding its magnitude, boosting 
purchasing power in emerging economies would 
both lift the overall level of global demand and 
facilitate its rotation. 
In principle, flows of capital from advance 
economies to emerging ones and the appreciation 
of the currencies of the latter over time are a 
mutually beneﬁ  cial secular trend, supported by 
strong fundamentals, better growth prospects, and 
high productivity differentials. Rather than ﬁ  ghting 
against this trend through overly restrictive capital 
controls or excessive reserve accumulation, there is 
strong legitimacy in using macroprudential policies 
to mitigate the adverse effects of volatility in capital 
ﬂ  ows, especially those with a speculative nature, over 
ﬁ  nancial stability. Of course, economic conditions 
and institutions differ across countries. An effective 
macroprudential tool in one country might not 
work in another country. Therefore, policy-makers 
need to take into account country-speciﬁ  c factors 
in designing their own framework and it is 
imperative for the academic world and international 
organisations to focus on this issue and develop a 
set of concrete policy tools that national authorities, 
at their own discretion, can use to identify, assess 
and manage systemic risks. 
2| FINANCIAL STABILITY 
AND CENTRAL BANKS
The critical importance of ﬁ  nancial stability from 
a central bank’s perspective is not new. Smooth 
functioning of the ﬁ  nancial system and payment 
mechanism has been a concern of central banks 
since their foundation. In fact, that is the reason why 
they are called “the bank of banks” or “the lender of 
last resort” for ﬁ  nancial institutions. However, over 
time as the ﬁ  nancial system goes more complicated 
and expanded exponentially, its supervision and 
regulation has been partially transferred to other 
institutions. The challenge faced by central banks is 
to establish a framework that combines both price 
and ﬁ  nancial stability as primary objectives and 
identify the policy instruments to target both, even 
at times when they seem to conﬂ  ict with each other. 
Central banks have typically calibrated short-term 
interest rates as their primary policy instrument to 
determine their monetary stance. Since policy rates are 
too blunt instruments that affect the entire economy, 
using them to achieve both of these targets may lead 
to unintended consequences. As the build up to the 
recent crisis has shown, the optimum interest rate 
level that achieves price stability at full employment 
may differ from the one that is optimal for the 
stability of ﬁ  nancial markets. The “Tinbergen Rule” 
suggests that this one instrument could be employed 
to achieve only one target, which in our case is 
conventionally recognised as price stability. There 
is clearly a need for a second set of policy tools. 
This second instrument, in my opinion, may be 
in the form of macroprudential tools that directly 
address ﬁ  nancial activities. 
Should all authority and responsibility related to 
ﬁ  nancial stability be centralised and vested in central 
banks? On the one hand, the beneﬁ  t of vesting the 
decision making power and responsibility under one 
institution, which happens to be the central bank, 
is clear: no coordination problem, more effective 
communication under one voice, and swift response 
to emergencies.
There are also downsides to such approach. 
The distinction between “goal independence” and 
“instrument independence” lies at the foundation 
of what we call central bank independence today. 
If central banks assume all regulatory and supervisory 
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activities regarding the ﬁ  nancial system and becomes 
the only authorities responsible for its oversight, the 
instruments needed to achieve that goal may reach a 
point where the principles of democracy necessitate 
a much closer coordination and cooperation with the 
government, blurring central banks’ independence. 
Expanding the role of central banks in the economy 
has the potential to create a strong and anomalous 
entity in a democracy that emphasises accountability 
and the responsibility of elected ofﬁ  cials.
 
Central banks played a vital role in maintaining 
ﬁ  nancial stability in the past and they are likely to 
do so in the future. The optimal use of policy rates 
and macroprudential tools to achieve both price 
and ﬁ  nancial stability would deﬁ  ne the criteria for 
assessing the success of central banks in the post 
crisis era. During the crisis, new monetary tools 
have been explored by the central banks. Now, in 
addition to continuing to explore such monetary 
policy tools, policy makers would have to elaborate 
on the uses of regulatory rules for limiting the risks 
threatening ﬁ  nancial stability and designing the 
optimal institutional structure for that purpose. The 
perfect balance between the risk of losing central bank 
independence and the risk of creating coordination 
problems (between the central bank and the regulatory 
and supervisory agency) still has to be found. 
3| FINANCIAL STABILITY 
AND MONETARY POLICY IN TURKEY
Turkey used to be one of the emerging economies 
with high volatility and particularly sensitive to 
global risk perceptions throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s. However, this time the headwinds from 
the global crisis have remained relatively subdued 
thanks to the resilience of the ﬁ  nancial system and 
prudent macro-policies. Of course, the growth rate 
of the economy has dropped sharply, but neither 
price nor ﬁ  nancial stability has been seriously 
jeopardised. In fact, Turkey was one of the few 
emerging countries that ended up with higher credit 
rating than pre-crisis level.
A combination of several factors made the difference, 
but lack of excessive borrowing turned out to be the 
key. Unlike its peers, the leverage ratios in Turkey 
stayed at moderate levels during the period of 
excess global liquidity, thanks to the policies of the 
Banking Regulatory and Supervision Agency and the 
Central Bank of Turkey. In fact, most of those policies 
implemented in Turkey since 2002 are incorporated 
into the Basel III principles, such as countercyclical 
buffers (banks in Turkey are not permitted to expand 
unless their ratio is at least four percentage points 
above the legal minimum) and liquidity ratios (both 
in local and foreign currency). Debt level of the 
public sector was also reduced signiﬁ  cantly thanks 
to a quite ambitious ﬁ  scal discipline that resulted in 
a primary surplus of ﬁ  ve percent of GDP on average 
between 2002 and 2006. Acceleration of household 
credits to excessive levels was prevented through 
timely monetary tightening in 2006. All in all, 
although debt level of the private sector increased 
before the crisis, which was a byproduct of the 
country’s convergence and the deepening of the 
banking sector, it never reached unsustainable levels 
that could threaten ﬁ  nancial stability.
The real strength of the economy, however, came 
from the management of foreign exchange (FX) 
risks, which is the most critical aspect of a small, 
open economy. Thanks to prudent regulations and 
oversight, the overall FX position of the Turkish 
banking sector was balanced. Since FX loans to 
individuals were prohibited, but FX deposits were not, 
households carried a signiﬁ  cantly large long position 
in FX. It was the corporate sector that carried a 
signiﬁ  cant FX position, about 10 percent of GDP. 
However, since the duration of their assets was short, 
whereas the duration of liabilities was long, the short 
term FX position of the Turkish ﬁ  rms was almost 
balanced as well. As it turned out, low leverage and 
low currency exposure became a major source of 
strength that contributed to the resilience of the 
Turkish economy to the global crisis, which in turn 
provided ample space to the Central Bank of Turkey 
to implement front-loaded and aggressive monetary 
easing without compromising price stability objective. 
Since no rescue package was needed to support the 
banking system, the government was also able to 
enact modest but still quite effective counter-cyclical 
ﬁ  scal policies in the midst of global turmoil.
Since early 2010 due to anemic growth in external 
demand, current account balance has been 
deteriorating rapidly, whereas core inﬂ  ation remains 
subdued and output gap persists. Recent surge in 
capital ﬂ  ows toward emerging markets, including 
Turkey, has the potential to exacerbate the divergence 
between the pace of recovery in the domestic demand 
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and external demand. If this pattern of growth 
coexists with rapid credit expansion and deterioration 
in the current account balance, it may lead to 
ﬁ  nancial stability concerns. These developments 
make it necessary to utilise policy instruments other 
than policy rates more effectively. Consequently, in 
today’s challenging ﬁ  nancial environment, which is 
likely to persist in the foreseeable future, the Central 
Bank of Turkey underscored four basic principles 
upon which the monetary policies would be built to 
maintain ﬁ  nancial stability.
The ﬁ  rst one is to discourage excessive leverage and to 
keep the debt ratios of banks and the corporate sector 
at modest levels. To that end the required reserve 
ratios in the Turkish lira (TRY) assets were raised 
(in consecutive steps starting from September 2010, 
from 5 percent to close to 10 percent as of January 2011) 
and remuneration of required reserves was ended. 
The second principle is to extend the maturity of capital 
ﬂ  ows and bank liabilities. This is important for improving 
the quality of the capital account and avoiding exchange 
rate misalignments. We decided to adopt a policy mix 
to deal with this situation. We lowered the policy rate 
and widened the corridor between overnight borrowing 
and lending rates so as to allow ﬂ  uctuations in the 
short-term interest rates, when needed. This policy so 
far has been quite effective. We observed a signiﬁ  cant 
drop in the short term speculative inﬂ  ows. In addition, 
we differentiated TRY required reserve ratios according 
to the maturity structure of deposits in order to lengthen 
the maturity structure of liabilities and reduce the 
maturity mismatch.
The third principle is strengthening the FX position 
of both the public and private sector, which is usually 
the Achilles’ heel of emerging deﬁ  cit economies. To 
that end the Central Bank of Turkey has adopted 
a new system for FX reserve accumulation that 
provides more ﬂ  exibility to the Bank, while raising 
uncertainty in the FX market in a controlled manner 
to prevent moral hazard problem. Also the required 
reserve ratio for FX assets has been raised three 
times in 2010 and kept above that of TRY assets. 
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
also applies various rules and mechanisms to keep 
FX position of banks in check and prohibits the use 
of FX denominated loans by households.
 
The fourth principle is better management of 
foreign currency risk by the corporate sector 
through instruments like the Turkish Derivative 
Exchange. The central bank is working together with 
supervisory agencies to encourage more widespread 
use of hedging instruments. 
Although it looks quite complicated at ﬁ  rst sight, 
the framework we adopt in spirit is not signiﬁ  cantly 
different from the conventional inﬂ  ation targeting 
framework. The only difference is that, previously 
our policy instrument was the one week repo rate, but 
now our instrument is a “policy mix” –which consists 
of a combination of short term interest rates, reserve 
requirement ratios and interest rate corridor. We seek 
to use these instruments in the right combination in 
order to cope with both inﬂ  ation and macroﬁ  nancial 
risks. The monetary policy stance in this framework 
is not only determined by the path of policy rates, 
but as a mixture of all the policy instruments, as 
I just mentioned. Just like the conventional inﬂ  ation 
targeting framework, the policy is forward looking and 
contingent on economic outlook. The course of the 
policy mix in the forthcoming period will depend on the 
factors affecting price stability and ﬁ  nancial stability.
We are going through a period in which central banks 
policies have to be creative in dealing with the “new 
normal”. In our part, we believe that a lower policy 
rate and a wider interest rate corridor combined 
with higher required reserve ratios may serve as 
an effective policy mix in dealing with rapidly 
increasing macro-imbalances driven by short term 
capital inﬂ  ows. 
Crises do not generate breaking points in history, say historians; they just highlight the existing trends 
which were less visible before. The recent crisis put front and center the rising economic power of emerging 
countries. It has also demonstrated the vulnerabilities within the global system, especially across ﬁ  nancial 
markets. Signiﬁ  cant steps have been undertaken to address the latter. However, there is still so much to 
do to tackle global imbalances, since that involves not only revisiting economic policies, but also economic 
and institutional infrastructure that shapes them. As the quest for a new global order continues both in 
theoretical and practical levels, the predictability, balance, and sustainability of the new global order will 
depend on the cooperative and coordinated efforts to establish a well-represented infrastructure.
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